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On Thursday March 11, 2004 (M-11), not long before eight in the 
morning, thirteen Islamist terrorists from a local Al Qaeda branch exploded 
ten bombs on packed commuter trains that were going to the Atocha 
station in Madrid. One hundred and ninety-one people died and more than 
two thousand were injured. There was great commotion, and the 
parliamentary electoral campaign for the renovation of the Congress of 
Deputies and the Senate on March 14, 2004 (M-14), was suspended. On 
Friday March 12, massive demonstrations were held in all the cities in the 
country. According to official estimates, about 2,300,000 people 
participated in the demonstration in Madrid. One of the slogans repeated 
most insistently by demonstrators was, “We want to know who it was, ETA 
or Al Qaeda” (“¡Queremos saber quién ha sido, ETA o Al Qaeda!”).  
The conservative Popular Party (Partido Popular, PP) government 
presided by José María Aznar hastened to point the finger at the ETA 
terrorist group almost immediately, ignoring any evidence that might point 
to Al Qaeda. According to the conclusion of a subsequent parliamentary 
commission, between M-11 and M-14 the government manipulated 
information so at to hold ETA responsible, as it believed that this would 
benefit the PP in electoral terms. The government also covered up any 
indications that Al Qaeda might be involved, fearing that it would have to 
pay an electoral price for its involvement in the war in Iraq. On the morning 
of Saturday March 13, at a time when all electoral activities were 
prohibited, PP candidate Mariano Rajoy told a national paper that he was 
“morally convinced” that ETA was the responsible. Hours later, 
demonstrations were held in front of PP headquarters in various cities to 
protest against the government’s management of the information in the 
wake of the attacks. On Sunday March 14, Election Day passed without 
incident. The results differed from those of the March 2000 general election 
in two notable ways: the level of participation was much higher and the PP 
was defeated by the main opposition group, the Socialist party (Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE), led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.  
  
 
4
 
This article explores the impact of M-11 on the electoral results. To 
what extent did the terrorist attacks change the voting preferences of 
Spaniards? And if they did, to what extent are they a necessary and 
sufficient factor when explaining the defeat of the party in government? 
These questions will be answered first by discussing the predominant 
interpretations of the impact of terrorism on electoral choices; second, by 
examining the causal mechanisms behind the impact of terrorism on the 
electoral results and their empirical relevance; third, by assessing the 
robustness of these causal mechanisms through different data and 
arguments; and fourth, by looking not only at the question of what but also 
to the issue of how much: through a counterfactual statistical analysis we 
will quantify the impact of the attacks on the election results. The final 
section presents the conclusions and examines the implications of the 
research.  
Interpretations and Electoral Calculations 
The 2004 election results appear to confirm that the attacks did have 
an impact on the electoral fortunes of the political parties. As shown in 
Table 1, participation levels rose to 75.7 percent, an increase of almost 
three million voters. And the PP, which had governed for the preceding four 
years with a comfortable absolute majority, lost the election, its vote 
declining from 44.5 in 2000 to 37.6 percent in 2004, and from 183 seats (52 
percent of the seats in the Congress of Deputies) to 148 (35.7). The PSOE 
won the elections with 42.6 percent of the vote (compared with 35.7 
percent in 2000) and received 164 seats (47 percent, compared with 36 
percent, or 125 seats, in 2000). The PSOE beat the PP by more than one 
million votes and by almost five percentage points, and became the party 
winning the highest number of votes ever attained in the short history of 
Spanish general elections (there have been nine thus far)1. 
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Table 1 
Seats and Votes in the 2004 General Election 
 2004 Differences 2004-2000 
 Votes Seats Votes Seats 
 In    In 
Party thousands % N % thousands % N % 
IU 1,284 5.0 5 1 -98 -101.0 -3 -2 
PSOE 11,026 42.6 164 47 3,107 8.4 39 11 
PP 9,763 37.7 148 42 -558 -6.88 -35 -10 
CiU 835 3.2 10 3 -135 -1.0 -5 -1 
PNV 421 1.6 7 2 67 0.1 = = 
Other regional parties 1,332 5.2 16 5 201 0.3 5 2 
Extra-parliamentary parties 822 4.7 - - 85 1.4 - - 
Totala 25,483 100 350 100 2,669    
         
Census 34,571    602    
Voters 26,155 75.7   2,816 +7   
Abstentions 8,416 24.3   -2,214    
a This refers to votes for the candidacies 
Source: Ministerio del Interior 
(www.elecciones.mir.es/MIR/jsp/resultados/index.htm) 
 
Given their magnitude and proximity to the elections, the attacks 
inevitably affected the behavior of Spanish voters. But the intensity of that 
impact, the number of people involved, and the mechanisms through that 
impact occurred need further detailed empirical analysis. The task is 
particularly difficult given the lack of precedents. Terrorism has been a 
factor in electoral campaigns in other Western countries. In the United 
States, the hostage crisis at the U.S. Embassy in Iran in the weeks prior to 
the election in November 1980 contributed significantly to the defeat of 
president Jimmy Carter and the victory of Ronald Reagan2. In the 
Netherlands, the assassination of Pim Fortuyn, the mayor of Rotterdam, 
nine days before the May 2002 election, the first political assassination in 
Holland in four centuries, led to the suspension of the campaign and a 
surprising 17 percent vote for his party, which came second in Parliament3. 
By contrast, in Spain the terrorist group ETA has “intervened” in various 
national and regional electoral campaigns, assassinating candidates, 
political leaders, lawyers, judges, and journalists. But voters did not 
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apparently change their behavior at the polls because of this, nor did the 
electoral expectations of parties change significantly.  
In theory, the impact of the M-11 attacks, the second most serious 
terrorist attacks in recent European history4, should have been greater. But 
although it is clear that they did have an impact, was this impact the 
consequence of a widespread or of a selective mobilization of specific 
sectors (such as new voters)? Was this impact the consequence of the 
reinforcement of a previous voting choice –which was simply intensified– or 
of a massive change of voting preferences? And if the latter is true, how did 
voters justify their abandonment of the party they had voted for in 2000 and 
their support for another? 
Most interpretations of the electoral consequences of the terrorist 
attacks have described their impact as a “drastic turn” (vuelco): their 
evidence is based on the defeat of the PP in spite of its leading the polls in 
surveys over the preceding two years5. As shown in Table 2, which 
presents a selection of the many polls carried out from January 2004 until 
ten days before the election, the PP was in the lead. But electoral 
predictions (in Spain and elsewhere) have to be taken with a pinch of salt. 
In previous elections predictions have turned out to be wrong without 
existing terrorist attacks or other exceptional or unexpected events6. 
Moreover, some of the surveys shown in Table 2 registered a gradually 
narrowing gap between the PP and the PSOE during the electoral 
campaign, and some surveys undertaken on 10-12 March put the PP one 
percentage point ahead of the PSOE, or even put the PSOE 2.6 
percentage points ahead of the PP7. In short, there was a technical tie 
before M-11: in some cases, differences between PP and PSOE vote 
estimates in Table 2 were narrower or included in the margin of error of the 
surveys. In short, any result was possible. The PP could have won (with 
more votes and, given the conservative bias in the electoral system, more 
seats)8, but it was equally feasible to expect a PSOE victory. 
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Table 2 
Vote Estimates in Some Pre-Electoral Polls, January-March 2004 a 
 2000           2004 
 Election    Sigma Celeste   Citigate Vox Sigma Election 
 Results Noxa Noxa CIS Dos Tel  Opina Noxa Sanchís Publica Dos Results 
PP 44.5 42.6 42.6 42.2 42.8 42.9 42.0 41.4 42.8 42.5 42.1 37.7 
PSOE 34.2 36.5 38.6 35.5 36.6 37.2 38.0 39.2 37.3 37.3 37.6 42.6 
IU 5.4 7.2 5.8 6.6 5.7 5.9 6.3 6.3 5.7 7.1 5.3 5.0 
CiU 4.2 3.0 2.8 3.7 3.3 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.2 
PNV 1.5 2.1 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.6 
CC 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.4 -- 1.0 0.9 
ERC 0.8 1.4 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.5 1.9 2.1 2.2 1.9 2.0 2.5 
Others b 8.3 6.2 5.1 7.3 6.9 6.4 6.2 5.4 6.0 6.5 7.8 6.5 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Sample  1,000 1,800 24,140 12,500 2,404 4,000 2,200 1,007 2,071 1,000  
Interview c  T T P T T T T T T T  
Time Period   1/7-9 2/6-12 1/24- 2/24- 2/17- 2/27- 2/27 3/1-3 3/1-3 3/5-6  
    2/15 3/2 3/5 3/1 3/3     
PP-PSOE  
Difference 10.3 6.1 4.0 6.7 6.2 5.7 4.0 2.2 5.5 5.2 4.5 -4.9 
a Noxa surveys were Publisher in La Vanguardia; Sigma Dos, in El Mundo; Celeste 
Tel, in La Razón; Opina, in El País; Citigate Sanchís, in Gaceta Fin de Semana; 
and Vox Publica, in El Periódico de Catalunya. The CIS survey was undertaken by 
the Centre of Sociological Studies (Centro de Estudios Sociológicos). 
b Figures in “Others” have been adjusted so that the total is 100. 
c T, telephone interview; P, personal interview.  
Source: Julián Santamaría, “El azar y el contexto”, p. 32.  
 
But if there was no a “drastic turn”, to what extent did the attacks 
erode electoral support for the PP government? This begs another more 
general question about the links between terrorism and assessments of 
government performance, on the one hand, and terrorism and voting, on 
the other. Most analyses of these issues are based on the reaction of U.S. 
citizens to the September 11, 2001 attacks: the approval ratings for George 
W. Bush increased spectacularly immediately after the attacks, and 
electoral support for Bush and the Republican Party increased considerably 
in the medium-term as well9. This reflects the view that domestic terrorism 
usually leads to a “praise for the leader”, while international terrorism 
makes people “rally round the flag”. Ceteris paribus, Spaniards might also 
have rallied round their government after the attacks and voted for it. But 
the link between terrorism and support to the incumbent worked differently 
in this case. Spaniards have become used so to speak to the terrorism of 
ETA over the last forty years and have exonerated governments for its 
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continued violent activities because they perceive that governments are 
helpless and ultimately not responsible for them. As we will see, the issue 
of terrorism played a marginal and even irrelevant role in evaluations of 
PSOE government performance and on the intention to vote for the PSOE 
in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s10. Moreover, the issue of ETA 
terrorism was systematically kept apart from party competition. Over the 
last few years, however, the PP government introduced the issue of anti-
terrorist policies in electoral competition, taking advantage of the 
overwhelming support of Spaniards for the anti-terrorist laws of the Aznar 
government11.  
After M-11, the PP made a seemingly simple electoral calculation: if 
the Al Qaeda attacks were attributable to ETA, the government could 
perhaps benefit from the praising our leader effect and in any case be 
exonerated from any responsibility, given that this has been the pattern 
until then and that its anti-terrorist policies were positively assessed by 
Spaniards. But if the attacks were attributable to Al Qaeda, citizens would 
immediately associate them with the government’s support for the 
intervention in Iraq, a support given on the basis of fallacious arguments at 
best, spurred on by the US against the will of every political force and the 
overwhelming majority of Spanish citizens. The failure of the government to 
sideline Al Qaeda before the election and the fact that Al Qaeda 
responsibility was ascertained before the election meant that the issue 
ceased to be whether terrorism (of either source) has an impact on voting 
behavior to become a question of both understanding how Islamist 
terrorism relates with government accountability and anticipating the ability 
of citizens to punish the government at the ballot box.  
As is shown below, a significant part of PSOE electoral gains and PP 
losses was a result of citizens blaming the government for the M-11 attacks 
because its active support for the intervention in Iraq; of perceiving 
manipulation in the information released by the government about the 
authorship of the attacks; and of assessing negatively governmental 
performance in the preceding four years. The vote therefore became a key 
mechanism for citizens to control and, in this case, punish, the government. 
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After all, this is what can happen when governments implement policies 
that the majority of citizens view negatively, and when they repeatedly 
ignore their preferences on relevant issues, and systematically evade 
responsibility. Thus, the electoral defeat of the PP government was 
ultimately an instance of democratic accountability. In the words of Manin, 
Przeworski and Stokes, “governments are ‘accountable’ if voters can 
discern whether governments are acting in their interest and sanction them 
appropriately, so that those incumbents who act in the best interests of 
citizens win reelection and those who do not lose them”12. Retrospective 
assessments of government performance by citizens are often confusing 
because it is difficult to make a connection between their situation and the 
incumbent policies13. But the M-11 events helped Spaniards to assess the 
PP government, and they did so by resorting to normal democratic 
procedures. As Key has put it, “the only really effective weapon of popular 
control in a democratic regime is the ability of the electorate to expel a 
party from power”14.  
The Impact of M-11: A Quantitative Analysis 
In the empirical analysis that follows, we have used a post-electoral 
2004 survey undertaken by Demoscopia to assess the impact of M-11 on 
the results of the general election of March 1415. Table 3 shows the 
relationship between the impact of M-11 as declared by respondents and 
their voting behavior16. It shows that 6 percent of voters (124 respondents) 
decided their choice after the attacks; most of them (more than 65 percent) 
ended up voting for the PSOE17. When the data are disaggregated, two 
complementary processes become apparent. On the one hand, 5 percent 
of respondents was mobilized as a direct consequence of the attacks (they 
would have abstained from voting otherwise); of these, another 65 percent 
ended up voting for the PSOE18. On the other hand, 5 percent changed 
their vote, and of these, 45 percent also joined the socialist electorate. The 
PP and the United Left (Izquierda Unida, IU) only got 11 and 3 of the 
mobilized respondents’ votes, and 6 and 3 percent of the transferred votes, 
respectively19. Notably, 19 and 16 percent of respondents said that Iraq 
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and government information about the attacks, respectively, were the 
issues that had the greatest influence on their vote20. The PSOE benefited 
most of all, particularly when the “no answer” respondents are not taken 
into account: in both cases, about 60 percent voted for the socialists, and 
only between 5 and 9 percent voted for the PP or the IU. 
 
Table 3 
The Impact of M-11 on the Electiona 
  M-14 party vote 
Impact PSOE PP IU Total 
Opted to vote for a party after  
the attacks 82 (4%) 17 (1%) 7 (0.3) 124 (6%) 
Was not going to vote, but did so  
after the attacks 93 (2%) 16 (0.5) 5 (0.2) 151 (5%) 
Changed party vote after the  
attacks 55 (2%) 7 (0.3) 4 (0.2) 122 (5%) 
PP government policy was  
responsible for the attacks 316 (11%) 29 (1%) 28 (1%) 545(19%) 
Information about the attacks was  
the most decisive in my vote  259 (9%) 40 (1%) 23 (1%) 465(16%) 
a The number of respondents is followed, in brackets, by the percentage (when that 
was more than 0.5 percent) of the total sample.  The total in each row is not the 
same. 
Source: Demoscopia Survey, 2004. 
 
These bi-variable relationships, however, can only show who wins 
votes, but not who loses them. Thus, Table 4 sheds light on electoral 
volatility or vote changes that occurred after the attacks, showing vote 
transfers after M-11. Only the 5 percent (122 respondents) that changed its 
party vote after the attacks (see Table 3) are taken into account. Again, the 
PSOE was the great beneficiary, losing 9 but gaining 55 votes. In other 
words, it gained 4 percent of its votes after the attacks as a result of 
electoral volatility. By contrast, the other parties lost votes after M-11. The 
PP and IU lost more than 5 and 3 percent respectively, and the National 
Galician Bloc (Bloque Nacionalista Galego, BNG) lost more than 70 
percent21. 
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Table 4 
Individual Electoral Volatility Before and After M-11 (by number of 
individuals)a  
M-14 Vote   Vote Before M-11 
Parties PP PSOE IU BNG Total 
PP  4   7 
PSOE 23  8 8 55 
IU  2   4 
BNG 1    1 
NC 9 1  21 45 
Other/Blank/Did not vote 10 3  1 15 
Total 38 9 8 30 122 
a To calculate the percentages, it should be noted that the final results according to 
the survey were as follows: PP 589; PSOE 1.139; IU 121; BNG 12, and no answer 
365. 
Source: Demoscopia Survey, 2004. 
 
These data are relevant but still insufficient. Electoral behavior cannot 
be explained in a deterministic way. It cannot be said that “given x, then y”. 
Probabilistic criteria must come into play (“given x, y, and a, y is probable”) 
because many issues influence voters, with each having a variable impact 
on voting behavior. To integrate all factors that may have shaped voting 
behavior on March 14, it is necessary to shift from a bi-variable to a multi-
variable analysis. Table 6 is based on a voter decision model that account 
for the most relevant factors of electoral behavior in Spain. The variables 
we have selected are the usual ones: socio-demographic (age, gender, civil 
status, level of education, employment situation, and religiosity); the basic 
political issues of the preceding legislature (the decision to support the 
invasion of Iraq and the overall view of government performance over the 
preceding four years); and views of party leaders and self-placement on the 
left-right ideological spectrum. As perceptions of the economic situation are 
known to have a significant impact on voting behavior, the fourth variable is 
voter assessment of the economy. Fifth, views of M-11 are also included. 
Finally, two classic political variables, political interest and level of 
satisfaction with the way democracy is working, are included to explain 
non-voting22. 
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Descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 5. According to the data 
we have examined, two hypotheses are tested. The aim is to understand 
whether those respondents who believed that government information 
about who was responsible for the attacks was self-interested and whether 
those respondents who blamed government foreign policy for the attacks 
were more likely than others to vote for the PSOE (and less likely to choose 
the PP, the IU, or to abstain).  
 
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics 
   Standard 
Variable Observations Media deviation Minimum Maximum 
PSOE vs. PP 1,729 0.66 0.47 0 1 
POSE vs. IU 1,260 0.90 0.29 0 1 
PSOE vs. abstention 1,551 0.73 0.44 0 1 
Civil status 2,929 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Employment situation 2,896 1.79 1.78 0 5 
Education levels 2,919 1.57 0.80 0 3 
Church attendance 2,854 0.98 0.86 0 3 
Gender 2,929 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Age 2,907 46.09 18.09 18 91 
Iraq intervention 2,823 0.28 0.60 0 2 
Incumbent performance 2,846 0.93 0.84 0 2 
Zapatero evaluation 2,755 5.92 2.41 0 10 
Rajoy evaluation  2,733 4.25 2.72 0 10 
Llamazares evaluation 2,348 3.66 2.42 0 10 
Ideological self-placement 2,338 4.65 1.94 1 10 
Assessment of economy  2,874 1.18 0.75 0 2 
M-11 and Iraq policy 2,929 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Information on attacks 2,929 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Source: Demoscopia Survey, 2004. 
 
In Table 6, the dependent variable in the statistical analysis is voting 
for the PSOE, the PP, the IU, and non-voting. Each of the three models 
attempts to explain the decision to vote for the PSOE (1) rather than for the 
PP (0); for the PSOE rather than for the IU (0); and finally, for the PSOE 
rather than abstaining (0). Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent 
variable, a logistical estimation model has been used23. 
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Table 6 
Results of Estimates of three Logistical Binomial Models, 2004 Electionsa 
Independent variables Models 
 PSOE (1) vs. PP (0) PSOE (1) vs. IU PSOE (1) vs. 
 ‘90’(0)((0)(0) (0) (0) IU (0) Abs. (0) (0) 
Socio-demographic 
 Genderb -0.54 (0.54) 0.17 (0,33) -0.20 (0.25) 
 Age (in years) 0.07***(0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 0.05***(0.01) 
 Civil Statusc 
 Married/cohabiting -1.21** (0.54) 0.17 (0.33) -0.44* (0.25) 
Employment situationd 
 Self-employed -1.56* (0.82) -0.32 (0.52) -0.03 (0.42) 
 Unemployed 0.87 (0.93) -0,08 (0.52) -0.59 (0.36) 
 Retired -2.62***(0.88) -0.65 (0.69) -0.83* (0.49) 
 Housewife -0.15 (0.78) -0.44 (0.60) 0.29 (0.38) 
 Student 1.16 (1.14) 0.20 (0.64) 0.17 (0.50) 
Education levele 
 Primary -1.61 (4.12) 1.16 (1.31) -0.86 (1.24) 
 Secondary -1.37 (4.15) 1.84 (1.36) 0.02 (1.27) 
 Graduate -1.80 (4.16) 0.70 (1.35) -0.66 (1.28) 
Church attendancef 
 Only religious holidays or less -0.38 (0.64) 0.84** (0.33) 0.69***(0.24) 
 At least once a month/week -0.96 (0.72) 1.32***(0.68) 0.91** (0.37) 
 More than once a week -1.83* (1.02) -1.56** (0.78) -0.59 (0.63) 
Assessment of basic political issues 
 Government decision on Iraqg 
 Average -0.40 (0.55)   -0.47 (0.37) 
 Good/Very good -3.48** (1.52)   -1.23 (0.84) 
Governmental performanceg 
 Average -1.95** (0.84) 1.09** (0.44) -0.31 (0.25) 
 Good/Very good -5.11** (0.95) -0.41 (0.65) -1.31***(0.35) 
Evaluation of leaders and self-placementh 
 José Luis Rodríguez  
 Zapatero (PSOE) 1.22***(0.17) 0.91***(0.10) 0.51***(0.06) 
 Mariano Rajoy (PP) -0.50***(0.13) 
 Gaspar Llamazares (IU)   -0.77***(0.10) 
 Voters’ self-placement -1.05***(0.17) 0.46***(0.13) -0.47***(0.08) 
Assessment of economic situation g 
 Average 0.30 (0.94) -0.02 (0.37) 0.50* (0.28) 
 Good/Very good -0.88 (0.92) 0.45 (0.49) -0.13 (0.30) 
Influence of M-11 attacksi 
 Consequence of PP  
 government foreign policy 2.73***(0.76) 0.96** (0.40) 1.18***(0.28) 
 PP government information  
 on authors of attacks 1.71***(0.59) 0.07 (0.37) 1.44***(0.31) 
Other political variables 
 Interest in politicsj 
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 Little     0.71***(0.27) 
 Some/A lot     1.34***(0.31) 
 Satisfaction with how democracy is workingk 
 Low     1.10** (0.45) 
 Some/A lot     2.00***(0.45) 
Constant 4.87 (4.47) -4.13** (1.66) -3.77** (1.49) 
Number of observations 1,381  917  1,132 
% of correctly predicted cases 97.8  91.7  87.1 
Pseudo R2 0.90  0.46  0.43 
a Robust standard deviations (in brackets).  Levels of significance are ***p <0.01; 
**p <0.05; *p <0.1. 
b The reference category (RC) (that to which the coefficients of the various models 
is compared) is being a woman. 
c
 The RC is being single, divorced, and widowed. 
d The RC is dependent worker. 
e The RC is being illiterate and lacking education. 
f The RC is never going to church. 
g The RC is a bad or very bad assessment. The variable of assessment of the 
incumbent decision on Iraq could not be included in the regression that explains the 
decision to vote for the PSOE instead of the IU because there was no variability 
among IU voters. 
h Evaluations of political leaders are graded from 0 (very unfavorable) to 10 (very 
favorable). Voters’ self-placement in an ideological scale is graded from 1 (left) to 
10 (right). 
i The RC is no influence. In both cases, they have been operationalized as two 
dichotomous variables which have the value of 1 when the respondent agrees with 
the statements included in the table, and 0 when they do not. 
j The RC is no interest. 
k The RC is no satisfaction with the way democracy is working. 
Source: Demoscopia Survey, 2004. 
 
The effect of socio-demographic factors, opinions on parties, and 
assessments of the economy play a similar role to that already known by 
previous analyses of electoral behavior24; although interesting, they are not 
addressed further here. All we wish to note here is that most of the 
variables are signed in the theoretically-expected direction, that many are 
statistically significant, and that the models correctly classify almost all 
respondents in each sample. Religiosity, age, civil status, and employment 
situation had a relevant impact on the propensity to vote for the PSOE 
instead of the PP, as well as on the decision to non-voting. Evaluations of 
political leaders and ideological self-placements are highlighted in the three 
models. As expected, government evaluations had a high and negative 
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impact on the decision to vote for the PSOE rather than the PP, and less of 
an impact on the decision to abstain. By contrast, the economic situation 
ceased to have the importance it had in previous elections.  
The important coefficients to focus for our purposes are those on the 
M-11 variables. As can be seen, both coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant in all the regressions; the only exception is the view 
of government information about those responsible for the attacks on the 
decision to vote for the PSOE instead of the IU. Thus, the probability of 
voting for the PSOE instead of the PP and instead abstaining was higher 
for respondents who think that the Madrid attacks were the result of the 
policy on Iraq, and/or for those who have a negative view of government 
information about the authorship of the attacks. But the probability of voting 
for the PSOE rather than the IU was only higher in the former case.  
Causal Mechanisms and Electoral Consequences 
The above data clearly shows that M-11 had an impact on electoral 
behavior in two ways. First, because the government was blamed for the 
attacks as a result of its support for the war in Iraq; second, because of the 
view that government information about those responsible for the attacks 
was at best self-interested and at worst manipulative. Each view reinforced 
the other. If a significant proportion of Spaniards held the government 
responsible for the massacre only three days before the election because 
of the government’s policy on Iraq, the government’s attempts to blame 
ETA even as evidence mounted up suggesting the opposite, finally 
triggered the increasing dissatisfaction that many Spaniards had felt over 
the preceding four years.  
Both reasons need to be examined more closely. Why was the 
government held responsible for M-11 when previous governments had not 
been blamed for ETA attacks? Contrary to what the government said, not 
all types of terrorism are the same: at least in the mind of voters, there are 
relevant differences between ETA and Al Qaeda terrorism. First, there is no 
causal link between government decisions and ETA terrorism: all 
democratic governments in Spain have had to face that threat. By contrast, 
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many Spaniards assumed there was a link between the foreign policy of 
the PP government and the Al Qaeda attacks. Second, government anti-
terrorist policies had never been questioned by either political leaders or 
citizens, at least until the PP came to power in 1996, and the issue was not 
included by any party in any electoral campaigns. By contrast, a huge 
majority of Spaniards and all the parties except the PP disagreed with the 
government’s reasons for supporting the intervention in Iraq (the non-
existent weapons of mass destruction, the alleged terrorist links of the Iraqi 
dictatorship, or the also alleged United Nations authorization). Thus, while 
anti-ETA policies can be characterized as a valence issue (over which 
there is a shared view), intervention in Iraq was a position issue (a 
conflictive one, shaped by each individual’s ideological position)25. In this 
regard, Table 7 shows opinions on and assessments of government and 
ETA terrorism. It confirms that, unlike Al Qaeda terrorism, this clearly is a 
valence issue26. While there was mass rejection of the government’s 
decision to support the war in Iraq, only 26 percent of Spaniards 
disapproved of anti-ETA government policy in 1988; and only 16 percent 
had a negative view of the PSOE government in 1988 (compared with 34 
percent for the PP in 2000). It is clear that ETA terrorism is a valence issue 
given the random distribution among various parties of those citizens 
dissatisfied with PSOE government anti-terrorist policies in 1988: 17 
percent voted for the PP, 11 percent voted for PSOE, and 5 percent votes 
for the IU. Similarly, only 35 percent of respondents in 2000 thought that 
the socialist government would have changed anti-terrorist policies for the 
better or for the worse, compared with the PP government.  
 
Table 7 
Opinions and Assessments Regarding ETA Terrorism, 1988 and 2000 (in 
percentages) 
Opinions and Assessments on whether Respondents… 
Approve of PSOE government anti-terrorist policies (1988) 
 Yes 54 
 No 26 
 No answer 19 
Evaluate PSOE government combating violence (1988) 
 Good/Very good 38 
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 Average 31 
 Bad/Very bad 16 
 No answer 15 
Evaluate PP government anti-terrorist policies (2000) 
 Good/Very good 28 
 Average  28 
 Bad/Very bad 34 
 No answer 9 
How the PSOE would have dealt with anti-terrorism if it had been in power (2000) 
 Better 12 
 Same 45 
 Worse 23 
 No answer 20 
Sources: See footnote 27. 
 
The situation changes dramatically when one takes Iraq into account. 
As Table 8 shows, almost 8 in every 10 Spaniards had a negative view of 
government policy on this issue. Assessments of government policy on Iraq 
were clearly divided between the parties of the left and the PP. Further, it 
was felt that the government ignored the preferences of the majority of 
Spaniards: no less than 87 percent thought this in 2004. What is more, the 
government was not considered representative: a government is 
representative when its policies and decisions best serve the interests of 
citizens, even when they contradict the preferences of some or most 
citizens in the short-term27. Government policy on Iraq was, at best, based 
on an information asymmetry: as long as people did not know whether 
there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, PP leaders believed it was 
possible to argue that the invasion was the best way to safeguard the 
interests of Spanish citizens. But after the Saddam regime was toppled and 
no such weapons were found, citizens rejected the government’s policy: 
only 5 percent of Spaniards believed that the war was worth it, and an 
overwhelming 86 percent felt otherwise. In other words, the government 
was not representative. And because it failed to act representatively, it may 
be punished in the ballot box: after the M-14 elections, 21 percent of 
respondents said that the invasion of Iraq had had a strong influence on 
their vote, and 16 percent said it had influenced their vote somewhat28.  
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Table 8 
Opinions on and Assessments of the War in Iraq, by Party Vote in 2004 (in 
percentages)a 
 Party vote 
Opinions and assessments IU PSOE PP Total 
Government decision to back Iraq invasion 
 Positive - 1 28 7 
 Neutral 13 4 33 12 
 Negative 87 94 34 76 
Government action in Iraq war responded to majority of public opinion 
 Yes - 2 12 4 
 No 100 95 72 87 
The war in Iraq was worth it     
 Yes - 1 19 5 
 No 97 97 63 86 
Government performance over Iraq influenced vote 
 A lot 12 10 2 7 
 Somewhat 11 24 6 14 
 A little 17 21 19 16 
 Not at all 60 43 70 56 
 (N) (119) (1,053) (469) (2,929) 
a Percentages do not add up to one hundred because non answers have not been 
included. Positive views include “very good” and “good” responses; neutral views 
include “not good or bad”; and negative views include “bad” and “very bad”. 
Source: Demoscopia Survey, 2004. 
 
In sum, additionally to the massive rejection of the incumbent policy on 
Iraq, the government was also blamed for the terrorist attacks that were for 
many connected to that policy. Further, efforts to manipulate information 
about who was responsible for the attacks aggravated the problem and 
were even radically rejected by many voters. In reality, the latter reinforced 
pre-existing negative views of governmental performance as a whole. As 
Barreiro notes, the “style” of the PP government was characterized by its 
tendency to ignore public opinion, lack of transparency, and a systematic 
scorn for opponents29. Assessments of specific government policies were 
similarly negative. As shown in Table 9, dissatisfaction was generalized in 
every policy area, except those of economy and employment, and with 
particular intensity in some cases30. If the perceptions that the government 
was responsible for M-11 (or that its information about its authorship were 
manipulated) were a necessary condition for the electoral punishment of 
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the PP, the negative view of practically all areas of policy areas was a 
sufficient condition for the PSOE to win former IU or PP voters, mobilize 
former non-voters, and attract young voters31. Thus, the attacks and the 
subsequent government manipulation triggered electoral changes that 
evolved during the electoral campaign. But those changes were made 
possible by the negative views of government policies as a whole over the 
preceding four years32. 
 
Table 9 
Assessments of Government Policy Performance by Party Vote in 2004 (in 
percentages)a  
 Party vote 
Assessments IU PSOE PP Total 
Economy and work     
 Positive 30 41 96 56 
 Negative 58 55 3 39 
Education     
 Positive 16 19 79 35 
 Negative 81 72 14 45 
Social policies     
 Positive 16 21 73 39 
 Negative 82 73 15 54 
Housing     
 Positive 3 7 54 20 
 Negative 93 89 42 73 
Terrorism     
 Positive 15 18 78 33 
 Negative 85 77 20 61 
Emigration     
 Positive 9 12 61 26 
 Negative 86 80 33 65 
Taxes     
 Positive 23 23 75 37 
 Negative 69 72 20 54 
Foreign policy     
 Positive 7 13 76 31 
 Negative 84 78 18 57 
 (N) (119) (1,053) (469) (2,929) 
a Percentages do not add up to one hundred because non answers have not been 
included. Positive opinions include the “very good” and “good” responses; negative 
opinions include the “bad” and “very bad” responses. 
Source: Demoscopia Survey, 2004. 
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From What to How Much: Three Counter-factual 
Simulations 
Having shown the link between voting behavior and M-11 through 
these two causal mechanisms, it is now necessary to determine the extent 
to which they had an impact on the election results. Counter-factual 
simulations can be used to ascertain what might have happened if the 
attacks had not taken place. As is well known, counterfactual analyses 
allow one to revise a causal hypothesis when research design is not 
experimental, or, in other words, the situation under study cannot be 
reproduced: counterfactual simulations draw inferences about events that 
did not actually happen33. Our results are summarized in Table 10. It shows 
what would have occurred under different scenarios, with simulations 
based on the regression estimates of Table 6. The percentages for the 
PSOE-PP, PSOE-IU and PSOE-non-voting comparisons have been 
calculated so that they add up to 100 percent for each pair. The survey 
results are reproduced in the first column34. The second column shows the 
electoral results arrived at on the basis of the three regression models 
(using the statistically significant coefficients in Table 6, and including the 
M-11 variables), with a separate calculation for the probability that each 
voter will vote for the PSOE rather than the PP; for the PSOE rather than 
the IU; and for the PSOE rather than abstain. In each case, the most 
probable electoral behavior is attributed to each person, with a 50 percent 
threshold. Thus, if a respondent is likely to vote for the PSOE by 46 percent 
and for the PP by 54 percent, they will appear as likely to vote for the PP. 
As it turns out, the PSOE has 64.9 percent and the PP has 35.1 percent of 
the vote; the PSOE has 76.4 and the IU 23.6 percent of the vote; and the 
PSOE gets 92.5 and non-voting gets 7.5 percent.  
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Table 10 
Three Simulations of Electoral Results according to Different Scenarios (in 
percentages) 
   Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 
  Predictions (no impact of (no influence 
  based on information of (simulations 
  regression management government 1 and 2 
Parties Survey data models on attacks) policy in Iraq) aggregated) 
PSOE 65.9 64.9 63.5 63.6 62.2 
PP 34.1 35.1 36.5 36.4 37.8 
 
PSOE 73.4 92.5 90.9 91.6 90.6 
Abstention 26.6 7.5 9.1 8.4 9.9 
 
PSOE 90.4 76.4 76.4 72.9 72.9 
IU 9.6 23.6 23.6 27.1 27.1 
Source: Demoscopia Survey, 2004. 
 
Three simulations were undertaken to estimate what would have 
happened to each pair of comparisons if nobody had thought that the 
attacks were the consequence of the conservative government’s policy in 
Iraq; if nobody had been influenced by the manipulation by the government 
when disseminating information about the authorship of the attacks; and if 
the two above scenarios were simultaneously true. To obtain these results, 
coefficients in Table 6 were used to calculate the probability of each type of 
electoral behavior, although first setting to 0 the variable on “consequence 
of PP government foreign policy”. The same thing was then done with the 
variable on “PP government information on authors”; and finally, the same 
was done with both variables. As shown in Table 10, in the first simulation 
the vote for the PSOE fell by 1.4 percentage points, and the vote for the PP 
rose by the same amount; the vote for the PSOE diminished by 1.6 
percentage points, and abstention increased by 1.6 percentage points; and 
the vote for the PSOE and the IU did not change. In the second simulation, 
the vote for the PSOE fell by 1.3 points and that rose by the same amount 
for the PP; the vote for the PSOE declined by 0.9 percentage points, and 
abstention increased by 0.9 percentage points; and the vote for the IU 
increased by 3.5 points, and decreased for the PSOE by 3.5 points. Finally, 
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in the third simulation, the vote for the PSOE fell by 2.7 points, and rose by 
the same amount for the PP; the vote for the PSOE fell by 1.9 points, and 
abstention increased by 1.9 points; and the vote for the IU rose by 3.5 
points and fell for the PSOE by 3.5 percentage points. 
The results of these simulations show clearly that the attacks had a 
small but significant impact on voting behavior, and that its effects were 
particularly important in terms of mobilizing abstainers and of transferring 
votes from the IU to the PSOE. For IU supporters, the assessment of PP 
government foreign policy was more relevant than how the government 
managed information after the attacks. PP voters and abstainers in 
particular also responded more to this latter issue. 
These conclusions must be interpreted with caution. As Heraclitus of 
Ephesus warned, one cannot swim twice in the waters of the same river: 
the assumption “all things being equal” is never completely satisfied in a 
simulation. And polls are only approximations to reality. The reconstruction 
of electoral behavior on March 14 is imperfect. Therefore, the conclusions 
of this empirical analysis must be seen more as an attempt to highlight the 
causal mechanisms through M-11 influenced the general election than as a 
precise quantification of that influence. 
Conclusions: Political Responsibility and Democratic 
Accountability  
According to so-called catastrophe theory, small, hidden changes can 
produce important changes when they are able to become apparent35. The 
impact of M-11 on electoral behavior on March 14 does not confirm these 
assumptions. If anything, the opposite seems to be true: the unexpected 
and traumatic M-11 attacks have not changed the electoral preferences of 
Spaniards. This article has aimed to determine the causal effect of the 
attacks on their voting behavior on March 14, and to analyze how that 
effect worked. After the statistical analyses undertaken on the basis of the 
post-electoral survey by Demoscopia, we have estimated that the attacks 
would have given a slightly higher percentage of votes to the PSOE. Even 
with the caution necessary in such analyses, this is a much more modest 
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proportion than that (needless to say, absolutely imprecise) which is usually 
referred to in political debates. Whatever the case, it must be remembered 
that if the attacks had not taken place, either the PP or the PSOE could 
have won the election: only days before M-11, the polls pointed to a 
“technical tie”. The reaction to the attacks changed that because of the 
negative assessments of both government foreign policy to support the 
invasion of Iraq and the manipulation by the government when informing 
the public about the authorship between the March 11 and March 14. While 
the former factor was particularly important in mobilizing abstainers and in 
turning IU voters –and PP voters to a lesser extent– into PSOE voters, the 
latter factor additionally explains why former abstainers voted for the 
PSOE, but were not relevant for IU voters.  
These reactions did not happen in a vacuum. They were conditioned 
by the also negative evaluations of the incumbent performance over the 
preceding four years. The results are conclusive. Every policy, barring 
economic and employment policy, was viewed negatively. This 
retrospective judgment became a sufficient condition for the PSOE to win 
former IU and PP votes, for former abstainers to participate, and for young 
voters to mobilize in the wake of the terrible commotion caused by attacks, 
and for which government was blamed.  
In the first chapter of his famous posthumous book, Key emphasized 
that his “perverse and unorthodox argument” could be summarized by the 
statement that “voters are not fool”36: although some certainly may act 
strangely, the majority behaves rationally and responsibly in light of the 
alternatives and information at their disposal. It must be added that voters 
are not blind either, although they are sometimes short-sighted; and nor are 
they amnesiac, although they are sometimes absent-minded. Faced with 
events like M-11, voters’ retrospective judgments do not have to be blind, in 
the sense posited by Achen and Bartels37, when it comes to holding a 
government to account. Moreover, the institutional conditions made 
accountability possible38: the high level of clarity about responsibility for the 
development of policies was maximized by the absolute majority support 
enjoyed by a single governing and cohesive party without internal divisions 
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or alternative leadership. Thus, the PP defeat was not just caused by the 
terrible attacks per se, but also by the working of the basic mechanisms 
that ensure democratic accountability. In a democracy, governments are 
representative because they are elected. Elections serve to hold 
governments accountable for their past actions. As they anticipate the 
judgment of voters, governments have a strong incentive to implement 
policies that are likely to be assessed positively. At the end of each 
legislature, governments are held accountable to the electorate for their 
management of public affairs. Voters assess their performance and vote 
accordingly. Because the majority of Spaniards felt that the government did 
not respond to their demands and was further unable to convince them that 
its policies were the best ones possible, they had a textbook response: 
punishment at the ballot box. When expressing their electoral choice, 
Spaniards collectively punished the PP and paved the way for a PSOE 
government. Ultimately, the vote became the decisive instrument used by 
citizens to control and, in this case, punish the government.  
 
 
 
Notes 
 
 We would like to thank Paz Fernández and Julián Santamaría for their 
assistance, as well as Belén Barreiro, Miguel Caínzos, Paz Fernández, Marta 
Fraile, Ferran Martínez, Ignacio Molina, Francesc Pallarès, Santiago Pérez-
Nievas, Alberto Sanz, Mariano Torcal, and José Ignacio Torreblanca for their 
comments on previous versions of this article. The financial support provided 
by the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid-Comunidad de Madrid (through the 
project 9/SHD/001) is also gratefully acknowledged. 
1. Analyses of the PP government’s performance in 2000-2004 and of the 2004 
electoral campaign, as well as the election results and their impact on the 
party system, can be found in Belén Barreiro, “14-M: elecciones a la sombra 
del terrorismo”, Claves de Razón Práctica 141 (2004): 14-22; Josep M. 
Colomer, “The General Election in Spain, March 2004”, Electoral Studies 24 
(2005): 149-156; Julián Santamaría, “El azar y el contexto: las elecciones 
generales de 2004”, Claves de Razón Práctica 146 (2004): 28-40; Mariano 
Torcal and Guillermo Rico, “The Spanish General Election: In the Shadow of 
Al-Qaeda?”, South European Society and Politics, 9 (3) 2004: 107-121; Robert 
M. Fishman, “On the Continuing Relevance of the Weberian Methodological 
  
 
25 
Perspective (With Applications to the Spanish Case of Elections in the 
Aftermath of Terrorism)”, Notre Dame: Kellogg Institute, University of Notre 
Dame, Working Paper 317, 2005; Narciso Michavila, “Guerra, terrorismo y 
elecciones: incidencia electoral de los atentados islamistas en Madrid”, 
Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, Working Paper 13, 2004; Pablo Oñate and 
Francisco A. Ocaña, “Las elecciones generales de marzo de 2004 y los 
sistemas de partidos en España: ¿tanto cambio electoral?”, Revista Española 
de Ciencia Política 13 (2005): 159-182; Francesc Pallarès, Alex Bosso and 
Jordi Muñoz, “Las elecciones generales de 2004 en España”, in Instituto de 
Derecho Público, Informe Comunidades Autónomas 2004. Barcelona: Instituto 
de Derecho Público, 2004; Alberto Sanz and Ana Sánchez-Sierra, “Las 
elecciones generales de 2004 en España: estilo de gobierno, política exterior 
y movilización”, Madrid: Departamento de Ciencia Política y Relaciones 
Internacionales, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Working Paper 48, 2005. 
Fundación Alternativas (FA) also published a debate among experts on these 
issues; see FA, “Guerra de Irak y elecciones del 14 M: un año después. 
Debate de expertos”, Madrid: Fundación Alternativas, Seminarios y Jornadas 
12, 2005. 
2. Paul Allen Beck, “Incomplete Realignment: The Reagan Legacy for Parties 
and Elections”, in Charles O. Jones (ed.), The Reagan Legacy: Promise and 
Performance. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1988, pp. 153-154. 
3. Paul Pennings and Hans Keman, “The Dutch Parliamentary Elections in 2002 
and 2003: The Rise and Decline of the Fortuyn Movement”, Acta Politica 38 
(2003): 51-68. 
4. The terrorist attack with the highest number of victims took place in December 
1988 in Lockerbie, Scotland, when Libyan agents crashed a Pan Am flight on 
its London-New York route: 259 passengers and crew were killed, and another 
11 people died hit by falling debris.  
5. See, for instance, Edurne Uriarte, Terrorismo y democracia tras el 11-M. 
Madrid: Espasa, 2004, p. 30. 
6. José Ignacio Wert, “Sondagens de opinão pública em Espanha e em 
Portugal”, Análise Social 167 (2003): 573-598. 
7. The first assumption is made in Carlos Malo de Molina, “La matriz de 
transferencia de voto”, Presentation at the XIII Seminar on Political and 
Sociological Research, AEDEMO, Madrid, 2004; the second appears in the 
presentation by Julián Santamaría in the FA, “Guerra de Irak”, pp. 33-34.  
8. Ignacio Lago and José Ramón Montero, “‘Todavía no sé quiénes, pero 
ganaremos’: manipulación política del sistema electoral español”, Zona 
Abierta 110-111 (2005): 277-348.  
9. See, for instance, the trends included in www.pollingreport.com. 
10. Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca and Belén Barreiro, Los efectos de la acción de 
gobierno en el voto durante la etapa socialista (1982-1996). Madrid: CIS, 
Opiniones y Actitudes 29, 2000. 
  
 
26 
11. Sanz and Sánchez-Sierra, “Las elecciones generales de 2004 en España”, p. 
17. 
12. Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, “Elections and 
Representation”, in A. Przeworski, S.C. Stokes, and B. Manin (eds.), 
Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999, p. 40. 
13. Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels, “Blind Retrospection: Electoral 
Responses to Drought, Flu, and Shark Attacks”, Madrid: Instituto Juan March, 
Working Paper 199, 2004. 
14. V. O. Key Jr., The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting 
1936-1960. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966, p. 76. 
15. This survey was directed by Richard Gunther and J. R. Montero, and 
conducted in April-May 2004, covering a representative sample of 2.929 adult 
Spaniards. The survey was financed by a consortium of researchers from Ohio 
State University, the Autonomous University of Madrid, the Autonomous 
University of Barcelona, the Pompeu Fabra University, the University of 
Santiago de Compostela, and the Institute of Social Studies of Andalusia.  
16. It should be noted that the Demoscopia survey, like most undertaken after the 
M-14 elections, notably under-represents PP voters. Our results are therefore 
more reliable for showing how M-11 influenced the election than for showing 
the extent to which it did so. Nonetheless, given that the political debate 
focused on the first issue and given that the intensity of that influence is well 
known, the Demoscopia survey is perfectly adequate to respond to the 
questions posed here. 
17. Voters were asked, “When did you decide to vote for your party?”. 
18. Respondents were asked, “What influence did the attack of March 11 in 
Madrid have on your voting decision?”. 
19. All respondents were asked, “How did the attack in Madrid influence your 
vote?”. 
20. All respondents were asked, “What most influenced your decision?”. 
21. The BNG rather than other regional parties was chosen because vote 
transfers before and after the attacks were only significant for the Galician 
nationalists. 
22. The use of such a well-specified model of voter choice does mean that we 
have some attrition of survey respondents due to the fact that some 
respondents did not answer a number of questions necessary to 
operationalize all of these variables. However, our samples appear very 
similar to the larger sample from which our data was drawn, thus providing us 
confidence in the representativeness of our samples of Spanish voters. 
23. Given the high number of parameters and specifications estimated, logistical 
regression facilitates the presentation and interpretation of the results more 
  
 
27 
than a multinomial model. Further, both are equivalent. See Michael R. 
Álvarez and Jonathan Nagler, “When Politics and Models Collide: Estimating 
Models of Multiparty Elections”, American Journal of Political Science 42 
(1998): 55-96. According to the results of the Hausman test, not presented 
here, the assumption of the so-called independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) can be accepted for all three models. 
24. See, for instance, Ignacio Lago, El voto estratégico en las elecciones 
generales en España (1977-2000). Efectos y mecanismos causales en la 
explicación del comportamiento electoral. Madrid: CIS/Siglo XXI, 2005, as well 
as the articles included in the Revista Española de Ciencia Política, (6, 2002), 
coordinated by Julián Santamaría and J. R. Montero, which is dedicated to the 
March 2000 election. 
25. According to Stokes’ classical definitions, position issues refer to those 
involving a defense of government actions from among a set of alternatives 
that define the distribution of voter preferences. Valence issues simply link the 
choice of political party with general conditions that most voters view positively 
or negatively; cf. Donald E. Stokes, “Spatial Models of Party Competition”, 
American Political Science Review 57 (1966), p. 372. 
26. The data on ETA terrorism are surprisingly scant. Information from the CIS 
databank is used here, and refers to survey 1.729 (February 1988) and survey 
2.382 (February 2000). See also Sánchez-Cuenca and Barreiro, Los efectos 
de la acción del gobierno, pp. 48 ff. 
27. See Przeworski, Manin and Stokes, “Elections and Representation”, pp. 29-
30. 
28. For a comparison of these data with those for other countries, which confirm 
the intensity of Spanish assessments, see, for instance, Philip Everts and 
Pierangelo Isernia, “The Polls-Trends: The War in Iraq”, Public Opinion 
Quarterly 69 (2) 2005: 264-323. 
29. In FA, “Guerra de Irak y elecciones del 14 M”, p. 8. 
30. Despite this exception, it should be remembered that in Table 6 the economic 
policy is only relevant to explain the vote for the PSOE rather than abstention, 
and only to a limited degree. 
31. It should also be remembered that, according to Table 6, assessments of 
governmental performance over the last four years was a fundamental 
variable to explain the PSOE vote vis-à-vis the PP, the IU, and even 
abstention. 
32. See Torcal and Rico, “The Spanish General Election”, p. 108. 
33. See James D. Fearon, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political 
Science”, World Politics 43 (1991): 169-195. For an empirical application of 
counterfactual analyses in the study of electoral behavior, see Michael R. 
Álvarez and Jonathan Nagler, “Economics, Entitlements, and Social Issues: 
Voter Choice in the 1996 Presidential Election”, American Journal of Political 
  
 
28 
Science 42 (1998): 1349-1363; and by the same authors, “A New Approach 
for Modeling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections”, British Journal of 
Political Science 30 (2000): 57-75. 
34. It should be noted that under-representation of PP voters is considerable in 
the Demoscopia survey: the relationship between PSOE and PP voters is 
practically 2:1, which is far from reality. However, the relationship between 
PSOE and IU voters (9:1) and PSOE voters and non-voters (7:3) are quite 
similar to the results of the actual elections. This means that the simulations 
data are more reliable in these latter two cases than in the first. 
35. Courtney Brown, Chaos and Catastrophe Theories. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, 1995. 
36. Key, The Responsible Electorate, p. 7. 
37. Achen and Bartels, “Blind Retrospection”, p. 28. 
38. G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian 
and Proportional Visions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000, chap. 
3. 
 
